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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF FOSTER PARENTS TO THE
CHILDREN IN THEIR CARE
I. INTRODUCTION
Foster family care is the child welfare service which provides sub-
stitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own
family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period, and
when adoption is neither desirable nor possible. The distinctive
component of foster family care is the development and use of the
foster family home to provide substitute family life experiences,
together with casework and other treatment services for both the
child and his parents.1
The practices and approach of the past regarding foster care have had a
direct bearing on the present concept and resulting problems in this field.
Foster care was originally conceived of as a temporary custodial arrange-
ment. Children were placed in foster homes when their parents were unable
to properly care for them, usually for reasons of abandonment, neglect,
abuse, or financial disability. Experience revealed that the separation of
children from their natural parents had very harmful effects, so the field of
child welfare directed its efforts toward recognizing parental rights and re-
sponsibilities and toward rehabilitating the parent-child relationship while the
child was in a foster home. "Concerted attention was given to preventing
foster care from aimlessly going on indefinitely. . . . [A] widely prevailing
belief developed that foster care must not be a way of life for children-it
should be 'temporary.' "2
Over the years, there has been a steady increase in the number of chil-
dren in foster cares accompanied by a definite shortage of child welfare fa-
cilities and services. Agencies have become overworked and understaffed
and as a result have not been able to maintain sufficient contact between
foster children and their natural parents which is essential for family rehabili-
tation and reunification. When a child is removed from his parents by court
order and placed in foster care, the case is periodically reviewed by the court
1. Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Care Service
5 (1959).
2. Smith, Permanent Or Long-Term Foster Family Care, 43 Child Welfare 192
(1962).
3. In 1968 there were approximately 316,000 children in foster care in the
United States. 240,000 of these were in foster family care, and 75,000 were in insti-
tutions. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Child Welfare Statistics 29
(1968).
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to determine whether the child should be returned to his parents. The court
relies on the agency's report of the progress of the parent-child relationship.
However, all too often the agency has not been able to attempt rehabilitation
of the family and is not able to submit an accurate case report to the judge.
The result may be either that the child remains in a foster home for an in-
definite period or that he is reunited with his natural parents before he or
they are psychologically and emotionally prepared for it.
There are an increasing number of children today who will never be re-
turned to their natural parents and never be adopted, consequently requiring
permanent or long-term foster care. 4  Foster parents often are the only real
family these children have ever known, providing them with the stability and
affection necessary for healthy emotional development. To move these
children from one foster home to another, or to return them to natural par-
ents who are unfit, can be extremely detrimental. It therefore seems im-
perative to afford more rights to foster parents in addition to the duties they
already possess,5 so that they might retain custody of the children in their
care and provide them with the benefits of family life.
II. FOSTER PARENTS AND THEIR PRESENT STATUTORY RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS
"[Foster] status most commonly arises when a court awards guardian-
ship and custody of a child to a child welfare agency which in turn delegates
the parental role to persons chosen by the agency." This status may arise
in other ways, such as when a court awards guardianship and custody to
someone other than the natural parents, usually a relative. It also includes
4. Lewis, Foster-Family Care: Has It Fulfilled Its Promise?, 355 The Annals
31, 36 (1964).
Do the children return home or move into adoptive homes? All of the evi-
dence indicates that permanent homes are not being achieved for most children
in foster-family care. Maas and Engler [Children in Need of Parents 350
(1959)], on the basis of their study of all children in foster care in nine dif-
ferent communities of various size, geographical location, and cultures, pre-
dicted that better than half the children in foster care at the time of the
study would live "a major part of their childhood in foster families and
institutions." . . . The Children's Bureau found that 58 percent of the children
in foster care under the auspices of public agencies had had more than one
placement; of this group, 16 per cent had had four or more placements, and
"in the rare case the child had been placed 22 times!" Do they maintain
close and meaningful ties with their own parents? Again the answer must
be "no". Maas and Engler found that in approximately half of the cases
parents visited infrequently or not at all.
5. [T]he legal rights and duties of foster parents are determined by the
common law doctrine of in loco parentis. Under this doctrine, persons hold-
ing themselves out as parents are held to similar, and often the same,
standards as natural parents. Courts use the in loco parentis doctrine to im-
pose on foster parents the same responsibilities as natural parents with respect
to providing their children with proper health, education, and environment con-
ducive to the development of sound moral character.
Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 Fam. L.Q. 283, 285-86 (1971). See also,
Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (1947).
6. Katz, supra note 5, at 285.
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persons who are given custody of a child prior to a final adoption decree,
and those who believe themselves to be adoptive parents, relying on an
adoption decree which is actually legally defective. Finally, a person may
be considered a foster parent if he cares for another's child through a formal
or informal arrangement, or if he voluntarily cares for a foundling. Illinois
courts have defined a foster parent as, "one who has performed the duties of
a parent to the child of another by rearing the child as his own child."1
7
Aside from the large institutions run by various child welfare agencies,
there are many different types of foster family homes. The Illinois Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services maintains five types: the emergency
or receiving home receives children needing immediate help who only stay a
short time; the special needs home takes the mentally or physically handi-
capped, young unmarried mothers, children who have had many previous
placements, or others with special problems; the infant home receives babies
released for adoption, who stay only until an adoptive home is found; the
temporary home keeps children for a short observation period until perma-
nent placements can be arranged; and the long-term foster home cares for
children until they can return to their own families or until they reach adult-
hood. It is the latter type of foster family that needs more legal rights so
that such children are not suddenly taken out of the only home they may
have ever known and placed in a foreign environment.8 The displacement
of these foster children can produce permanent emotional problems,9 and all
too often the law disregards what is best for the children.
At the present time, foster parents in Illinois and elsewhere enjoy al-
most no rights with respect to their foster children. Under the Illinois Juve-
nile Court Act, foster parents are not made parties to nor given notice of any
proceedings concerning their foster children, although they do have a right to
be heard. 10 This renders them practically powerless to fight for the custody
of the children.
Possible reasons for foster parents' lack of rights could be the persistence
7. People v. Parris, 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 936, 267 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1971).
8. J. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (1969).
9. [A] twenty month old boy was driven away from his home to a strange
man's office; there he met another strange man who took him away to a
strange house with a strange woman and strange children to greet him, to be
put to bed in a strange cot in a strange room. This man is his 'natural' father
and there he must stay, leaving behind what is at present a conscious memory,
but will soon become an unconscious but nevertheless real memory of all
that meant his life and made sense to him about himself.
Lawson, Adoption Law and Child Care, 116 New L.J. 633 (1966).
10. The pertinent section reads as follows:
Though not appointed guardian or legal custodian or otherwise made a party
to the proceeding, any foster parent or representative of an agency or asso-
ciation interested in the minor has the right to be heard by the court but
does not thereby become a party to the proceeding.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-02(2) (1971). The only other right given to a foster
parent under Illinois law is that he may petition the court for a change in the custody
of the child in his care. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 705-8(2) (1971).
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of the original concept that they were merely temporary custodians, which,
in most instances, is no longer the case today." Another explanation could
be that there is a deliberate legislative intent to keep their participation at a
minimum to prevent interference with parental rights. It is apparent that
such curtailment of the legal standing of foster parents, accompanied by the
view taken by some courts that the rights of natural parents and agencies are
always paramount over the rights of foster parents, often results in disregard
of the best interests and wishes of the child. In addition to the possible
harmful effects on the child as a result of foster parents' lack of rights,12 the
threat of the impermanence of the foster relationship can have damaging
effects on the foster family itself.
The nonrelatedness of the child and the foster parents (with the
corollary of impermanence) means that the child does not share
the past, and presumably the future, of the foster family. The
child comes with different values, different behaviors, and with
close ties to another family. It is not clear what continuing de-
mands are made on the foster family and the child in learning to
live together, to trust, and to love each other. This is particularly
true in the placement that goes on and on, without termination but
also without the assurance of permanence. Can these families and
children fully share the joys of common goals and aspirations?
Can they enter fully into parent-child relationships, or must there
always be some holding back?13
III. NATURAL PARENTS VERSUS FOSTER PARENTS
Courts are generally reluctant to award the custody of children to some-
one other than the natural parents, 1 4 except in cases involving children who
are clearly abused, neglected, or abandoned. Many courts have adopted the
rule that in custody disputes between a parent and a third person, the par-
ent has a paramount right to custody unless he is shown to be unfit, which is
often difficult to prove under the existing statues.' 5 However, under a more
11. Lewis, supra note 4, at 37. See also, Glover & Reid, Unmet and Future Needs,
355 The Annals 9 (1964).
12. For significantly large proportions of children in foster care, what was
meant to be a temporary plan was permitted to drift, so that the original in-
tent was not carried out. Many of these children, having been placed and
replaced, began to act up and soon (even if legally available) were neither
adoptable nor able to get along in foster homes.
Kahn, Child Welfare: Trends and Directions, 41 Child Welfare 459, 469 (1962).
13. Lewis, supra note 4, at 40.
14. The starting point . . . is the obvious but often overlooked principle
that in the going family the parents are entitled to the custody of their
children. . . . One reason for this is the firmly held belief that . . . parents
will generally be more successful in caring for their children than strangers
or agencies of the state. There is also the traditional conviction that the pro-
found and elemental emotional ties between parent and child should be re-
spected by the state although the child might have greater material advantages
and perhaps might receive better care in the custody of someone else.
H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 591 (1968).
15. See, for example, the grounds of parental unfitness defined in the Illinois
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enlightened approach, some states (including Illinois) have adopted the view
that the controlling consideration in such cases should be the best interest of
the child.' 6 In the leading case of Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home17
the Illinois Supreme Court articulated the rule as follows:
It is always recognized that a natural parent has a superior right to
the custody of his child. That right, however, is not absolute and
must yield to the best interest of the child. Such superior right
only obtains when it is in accord with the best interest of the child.
[citations omitted] The parent need not be shown to be totally unfit
to rear the child in order to deny to him the custody of the child.
Fitness of the parent is only one of the factors to be considered in
determining how the best interest of the child may be served. The
sufficiency of the parents' home, its surroundings, and all other
matters that have a bearing upon the welfare of the child are to be
considered. [citation omitted] The parents' natural rights must give
way to the welfare and best interest of the child. [citations
omitted]
i8
However, there was a divergence of views in the Giacopelli case and three
justices concurred in the result only because they found sufficient evidence of
the parents' unfitness. As a result, the law in Illinois continued to fluctuate1 9
until the supreme court finally settled the conflict in People ex rel. Edwards
v. Livingston.20 This case, involving a habeas corpus action by the father of
the child against the grandfather, ended the uncertainty in Illinois custody
law by holding that a natural parent may be deprived of the custody of his
child without a finding of unfitness. "The best interest of the child is the
standard and it is not necessary that the natural parent be found unfit or be
found to have legally forfeited his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest
of the child that he be placed in the custody of someone other than the
natural parent."
21
A recent application of this rule is the 1972 case of People v. Hoerner.22
Adoption Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (1971). However, in Illinois proof of
unfitness is not necessary in custody cases and is required only in adoption cases which
seek to terminate parental rights.
16. For a history of Illinois case law leading to the adoption of this view, see
Veverka, The Right of Natural Parents to Their Children as Against Strangers: Is the
Right Absolute?, 61 Ill. B.J. 234 (1973).
17. 16 Ill. 2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959).
18. Id. at 565-566, 158 N.E.2d at 618.
19. Mackie v. Mackie, 88 I11. App. 2d 61, 232 N.E.2d 184 (1967); Robinson
v. Neubauer, 79 I11. App. 2d 362, 223 N.E.2d 705 (1967); Sholty v. Sholty, 67 Ill.
App. 2d 60, 214 N.E.2d 15 (1966); People ex rel. Pace v. Wood, 50 Ill. App. 2d 63,
200 N.E.2d 125 (1964); McAdams v. McAdams, 46 I11. App. 2d 294, 197 N.E.2d 93
(1964); Houston v. Brackett, 38 Il. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (1963); Campbell
v. Fisher, 28 II. App. 2d 454, 171 N.E.2d 810 (1961).
20. 42 111. 2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
21. Id. at 209, 247 N.E.2d at 421. Although the grandparent was given custody,
the court decided that it was in the child's best interest to award him temporary cus-
tody only, considering his age (76), the fact that the father had had custody pending
appeal, and the lack of a woman in the grandfather's house.
22. 6 Ill. App. 3d 994, 287 N.E.2d 510 (1972).
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The children in this case had been adjudged neglected and were made wards
of the court. They were placed in foster homes where they adjusted very
well. Thereafter the parents attempted to regain custody by showing that
they had reformed and had improved their living habits. The Illinois Su-
preme Court gave great weight to the facts that the children had been in
stable family situations for several years in the foster homes and that they
had overcome the behavioral problems which were manifest when they were
removed from their natural parents. The court also considered expert testi-
mony to the effect that removal from their present homes would have se-
verely detrimental emotional effects on the children. While recognizing the
natural parents' genuine determination to do better, the court stated that,
"the true prospects are at best tenuous,"' 23 and held that the best interests of
the children would be served by allowing them to remain with the foster par-
ents. The court concluded its opinion with a quote from the Giacopelli case:
"We cannot uproot the child from an adoptive home full of love, care, and
opportunity, for the sole and only purpose of placing him with his natural
parents.
'24
Thus, it appears that linois, as well as other states, 25 has adopted a
more realistic approach to the custody dispute problem between parents and
foster parents. Recognizing thereby that the paramount consideration
should be the best interest of the child, rather than the traditional presump-
tion that the natural parent is entitled to custody unless found to be unfit.2 6
Where the child's welfare is the controlling question, the following factors are
usually taken into account: the character and past conduct of the parents;
the circumstances in which the child would live; the child's preference if
he is old enough to make a rational choice; the length of time the child has
been in the custody of the foster parents; the nature of his relationship to
them, and the degree of contact maintained with the natural parents.2 7  Al-
23. Id. at 998, 287 N.E.2d at 512.
24. Id.
25. Cases in other states which have held the child's best interest to be the con-
trolling test include: Evans v. Wilkes, 48 Ala. App. 363, 265 So. 2d 145 (1972); In re
One Minor Child, 254 A.2d 443 (Del. 1969); In re McClasson, - Iowa -, 195 N.W.
2d 116 (1972); Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 144 N.W.2d 861 (1966); Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S.W.2d 954; In re
Cole, 265 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 1972); Grover v. Grover, 143 Me. 34, 54 A.2d 637
(1947); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 Mass. 261, 85 N.E.2d 768 (1949); State ex rel. Fisher
v. Devins, - Minn. -, 200 N.W.2d 28 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Bendrick v.
White, 403 Pa. 55, 169 A.2d 69 (1961); In re Guardianship of Palmer, 81 Wash. 2d
604, 503 P.2d 464 (1972).
26. Cases adhering to the parental unfitness rule include: Nolan v. Nolan, 240
Ark. 579, 401 S.W.2d 13 (1966); Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999
(1944); McGuire v. McGuire, 190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908 (1962); In re Gibbons,
247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957); Ludy v. Ludy, 84 Ohio App. 195, 82 N.E.2d
775 (1948). Some courts use a combination of the two tests, reasoning that there
is a presumption that the child's welfare will best be served by giving custody to the
natural parent. See, e.g., LeRoy v. Odgers, 18 Ariz. App. 499, 503 P.2d 975 (1972).
27. Clark, supra note 14, at 593-94.
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though not specifically articulated in any Illinois case, it may be that once a
child has remained in a foster home for a long period of time, the rights of
foster parents become stronger as opposed to those of natural parents. The
following view should be adopted in Illinois:
Foster parents may in fact enjoy the right to custody without bene-
fit of the label. A de facto custodial interest develops in a foster
parent when the foster relationship continues over a length of time.
Courts are reluctant to interfere with this interest and, if they do in-
terfere, the foster parent is generally entitled to notification and an
opportunity to appear and defend his interest. A continuing foster
relationship, if secure and orderly, is typically protected even
against a natural parent's unreasonable intrustion. If a natural
parent wishes to interfere with the foster parent relationship, he
must as any other individual, carry the burden of proving the foster
parent's unfitness, as well as the burden of showing that the child's
needs will be served best by another custodial arrangement.
28
A recent and much publicized Illinois case in the Will County Juvenile
Court illustrates the dilemma faced by a court when parents demand the re-
turn of their children who have lived with a foster family for a long period. 29
In this case, the natural parents of two girls who had lived in a foster home
for seven years succeeded in obtaining a court order removing the children
from the foster parents. The girls, ages ten and twelve, were ordered to be
placed in an orphanage for an unspecified time and were led from the court-
room kicking and crying. The orphanage was to be a "neutral setting"
where they could establish ties with their natural parents, and meanwhile
the foster parents were prohibited from visiting them. The girls had
been taken away from their parents in 1966 following a finding of neglect.
Although the court had a difficult decision to make, it appears that it may
have been guided by the principle of parental rights rather than by the best
interests of the children. The foster parents were the only family the girls
knew, but they had no legal standing to challenge the removal of the children
from their home. Because of the weakness of the law in this area, the chil-
dren are the losers in such custody disputes.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In many instances when a child is placed in foster family care, the na-
tural parent will maintain contact for a while and then gradually lose interest
28. Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Applica-
tion of "the Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 145, 160 (1966).
See also, In re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Iowa 1180, 59 N.W.2d 685 (1953); Cummins
v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S.W.2d 959 (1929); and State v. Knight, 135 So. 2d 126
(La. App. 1961).
29. Ross v. Reeves, No. W66F243J (111. Cir. Ct., March 9, 1973). See, Chicago
Sun Times, March 12, 1973, § 1, at 20, col. 1; Chicago Tribune, March 13, 1973, § 1,
at 9, col. 1; Chicago Daily News, March 14, 1973, § 1, at 3; Keegan, Children Are
Losers in Custody Battles, Chicago Tribune, March 21, 1973, § 1C, at 6, col. 1.
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until the only contact between parent and child is an occasional visit or gift.
Even though he is unwilling or unable to reassume custody himself, the par-
ent frequently will refuse to consent to the child's adoption by someone else
(often the foster parents). Unless the natural parent's rights are terminated,
the child is literally in limbo and is likely to be deprived of a permanent fam-
ily.80
Three types of statutes are presently in force in various states dealing
with this problem and allowing permanent termination of parental rights so
that the child is free for adoption.31  The first type dispenses with the re-
quired consent of the natural parent to the adoption of his child when such
consent is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child.3 2 The second
type provides for the termination of the rights of a parent who has abandoned
his child.A' Some of these statutes, including Illinois', allow a court in an
adoption proceeding to dispense with the requirement of the natural parent's
consent if he has abandoned the child.34 A few abandonment statutes pro-
vide, at least in theory, for a prior separate determination of the issue of
abandonment and for the termination of all parental rights if abandonment
is found.35  These statutes generally specify other conduct besides aban-
donment as grounds for termination of parental rights and they usually con-
tain a more detailed definition of abandonment. The third type of statute
also provides that lack of parental care or attention can justify the permanent
termination of parental rights. However, this statute requires that the ter-
mination take place in a proceeding separate from the adoption proceeding
and omits the word "abandon". The New York permanent neglect statute8 6
30. See, e.g., In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1969), rev'd per
curiam sub nom., In re Kiug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1969).
31. Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of
Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 St. John's L. Rev. 215
(1971).
32. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-106 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 74
(1957), as amended (Supp. 1970); Va. Code Ann. § 63.1-225 (Supp. 1972).
33. Ala. Code tit. 27, § 3 (1958); Cal. Civil Code ch. 4, § 232, 233 (West
Supp. 1970); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103 (Supp. 1970); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.011
(1969); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-1, 9.8-8 (1971); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. tit. 61-205
(1970); Pa. Stat, Ann. tit. 1, § 1.2 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1970); Tenn. Code Ann.
H9 36-102, 39-110 (Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 435 (1958); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 48.40 (1957), as amended (Supp. 1973).
34. Ala. Code tit. 27, § 3 (1958); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (1971);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 435 (1958).
35. Cal. Civil Code ch. 4, §§ 232, 233 (West Supp. 1970); Del. Code Ann. tit.
13, § 1103 (Supp. 1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1.2 (1963), as amended (Supp.
1970); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.40 (1957), as amended (Supp. 1973).
36. N.Y. Fano. Ct. Act § 611, 634 (McKinney 1963). The core provisions
appear as follows:
Sec. 611. Permanently neglected child
A "permanently neglected child" is a person under eighteen years of age
who has been placed in the care of an authorized agency, either in an institution
or in a foster home, and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period of
more than one year following the placement or commitment of such child in
the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
represents this third type and is believed to afford a better solution to the
problems of children in long-term foster care than do the best interest and
abandonment statutes.
Best interest and abandonment statutes are encumbered by a thick
gloss of restrictive constructions, and, because petitions under them
are usually brought as part of the adoption proceeding, the statutes
can lead to unfairness and confusion. Statutes speaking more di-
rectly to indefinite foster placements and requiring a prior, separate
proceeding to terminate the parent's rights are more suitable to the
task.87
By omitting the words "abandon" and "best interests", the New York statute
avoids judicial interpretation of these terms. The statute applies directly to
the situation of the parent who deserts his child in long-term foster care, and
defines specific conditions which will allow a court to sever parental rights
permanently.
Under the Illinois statute, a parent's consent to adoption is not required if
the parent is found to be unfit.38 The grounds of unfitness, in addition to
abandonment (which is undefined), include: failure to maintain a reasona-
ble degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the child's welfare; sub-
stantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated; depravity; open and
notorious adultery or fornication; habitual drunkenness for one year; ex-
treme and repeated cruelty to the child; desertion of the child for more than
three months; or other neglect or misconduct toward the child. 9 Illinois
courts have generally been reluctant to find abandonment or desertion in
cases seeking to declare a parent unfit and clear and definite proof is re-
quired in such cases.
40
to maintain contact with and plan for the future of the child, although phy-
sically able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent effort to encourage
and strengthen the parental relationship. In the event that the parent de-
faults after due notice of a proceeding to determine such neglect, such
physical and financial ability of such parent may be presumed by the court.
Sec. 614. Originating proceeding permanently to terminate custody
A proceeding permanently to terminate the parent's or other custodian's
custody of a child is originated by a petition, alleging:
(A) the child is a person under eighteen years of age;
(B) the child has been placed in the care of an authorized agency, either
in an institution or in a foster home;
(C) the authorized agency has made diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship and specifying the efforts made;
(D) the parent or custodian, notwithstanding the agency's efforts, has
failed for a period of more than one year following the placement or com-
mitment of such child in the care of an authorized agency substantially and
continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with and plan for the future
of the child although physically and financially able to do so; and
(E) the moral and temporal interests of the child require that the
parents' or other custodian's custody of the child be terminated permanently.
37. Gordon, supra note 31, at 260.
38. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1971).
39. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (1971).
40. Petition of Smith, 4 Ill. App. 3d 261, 280 N.E.2d 770 (1972); Robinson v.
Neubauer, 79 Ill. App. 2d 362, 223 N.E.2d 705 (1967); Carlson v. Oberling, 73 Il.
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The termination of parental rights may be even more difficult in cases
involving illegitimate children as a result of the recent United States Supreme
Court ruling in Stanley v. Illinois.4 1 The Court held that the father of an il-
legitimate child was entitled to a due process hearing on fitness before his
child could be removed from custody as a dependent child under the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act. The Court said that the state could not presume the
father's unfitness because his child was illegitimate and could not refuse him
a hearing on his rights to custody. The Stanley decision thus has a great im-
pact on adoption cases involving illegitimate children. Previously, section
9.1-8 of the Illinois Adoption Act provided that consent to adoption need
not be obtained from a putative father. 42 According to the Illinois Attorney
General, as a result of Stanley, consent must now be obtained from both the
father and the mother of the illegitimate child and a non-consenting or an
unknown parent must be made a party defendant in any adoption proceed-
ing.4 3  If the putative father refuses to consent, is unavailable, or cannot be
identified, it will be necessary to allege that he is an unfit person on one of
the grounds defined in the Adoption Act. In the typical case involving the
father of an illegitimate child, the ground alleged would be abandonment.
However, Illinois courts are likely to continue to require firm proof of aban-
donment in such cases. In order to prove abandonment, it would first
have to be shown that the father knew of the child's existence and that
he had a reasonable chance to decide if he intended to abandon him.
Personal service should be used whenever possible, but notice by publication
will be required when the father or his whereabouts are unknown.
44
Thus, it is apparent that the Stanley case has further complicated the termi-
nation of parental rights. It will most certainly result in delays and put the
finality of many adoption decrees in doubt.
45
No matter what type of present state statute governs a case of termina-
tion of parental rights, "[i]n all such cases the crucial factor should be the
child's welfare, both material and psychological, considering in particular the
ties of affection he has formed and the consequences of breaking those
ties." 46
App. 2d 412, 218 N.E.2d 820 (1966); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 48 Ill. App. 2d 455, 198
N.E.2d 770 (1964); Houston v. Brackett, 38 Ill. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (1963).
41. 405 U.S. 465 (1972). See Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"-Rights for
Fathers of Illegitimate Children, 61 Ill. B.J. 350 (1973).
42. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1971).
43. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. 542 (1972).
44. 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, 8H 704-3, 704-4 (1971).
45. 61 111. B.J. 378 (1973). See also Kleinman, Nightmare With Real Victims,
Chicago Tribune, December 4, 1972, § 2 (Features), at 17, col. 1; id., December 5,
1972, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
46. Clark, supra note 14, at 631. See also In re E., 239 A.2d 626 (Del. 1968),
which held that the best interest of the child is the primary consideration in parental
termination cases. The child had lived with the foster parents for all of her eight years,
and the mother had only visted the child once. The court held that the mother had
abandoned the child and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest
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V. AGENCIES VERSUS FOSTER PARENTS
The courts rely heavily on social service agencies to provide foster
placement for children and agencies are given great discretion in making cus-
todial dispositions. Generally, courts have neither the time nor the facilities
to supervise agency placements and it is only when a person has been re-
jected as a qualified custodian that courts have an opportunity to review
agency practices. 47 Many times the courts are called upon to resolve the
conflict that arises when foster parents challenge the decisions of agencies
which have disqualified them from continuing to have custody of or adopting
their foster child.
It has been suggested that a justification for court decisions which deny
foster parents the custody of their foster children in such disputes is the need
to preserve the foster home system. The reasoning is that if foster parents
are allowed to violate their agreements with the agency to return the children
on demand and, if they are thereby able to acquire children for adoption,
the agency will no longer be able to make temporary placements in foster
homes.4s  However, this reasoning is questionable because determinations
of whether to allow the foster parents to adopt should be made on a case-by-
case basis, taking into consideration the circumstances of each situation. If
it is apparent the foster child will remain in long-term foster care and will
not be returned to his parents, foster parents should be allowed to adopt if
they so desire. 4 9 Such decisions in these particular cases should not inter-
fere with or jeopardize situations where only temporary placements are re-
quired.
of the child, in order to facilitate adoption by the foster parents.
In a recent Iowa case, In re McDonald, - Iowa -, 201 N.W.2d 447 (1972), the
state supreme court upheld the termination of the parental relationship upon the
grounds that the low I.Q.s of the parents made them unable to give their children
proper care and attention (the mother's I.Q. was 47, and the father's was 74). The
statute relied upon by the court stated that the parental relationship could be terminated
if the court finds "[that the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, intoxication,
habitual use of narcotic drugs, repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, or other con-
duct found by the court likely to be detrimental to the physical or mental health or
morals of the child." Iowa Code Ann. § 232.41(d) (1969). See also, In the Matter
of Stephen B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1972), where the court termi-
nated the parental rights of a mentally unstable mother, based on the New York per-
manent neglect statute.
47. Katz, supra note 28, at 145.
48. Clark, supra note 14, at 597.
49. Several years ago, forward-looking agencies began to accept the notion
that children hard to place for adoption may become attractive as adoptive
children to those foster parents who had cared for them on a boarding basis
and that the transition should be facilitated. Also, there are potential adoptive
parents who quite naturally hesitate about adopting children with physical
and mental-emotional handicaps, or with racial-ethnic backgrounds other than
their own. In such instances, a period of mutual experience in a foster care
arrangement may be useful in itself and may also provide the basis for a
realistic adoption decision.
Kahn, supra note 12, at 473.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In many cases, by denying foster parents the right to custody by adop-
tion, courts have disregarded the best interests of the children. All too often
the courts have allowed the welfare of the child to be subordinated to strict
principles of contract law or to the notion that the integrity and power of the
agency must be upheld. For example, In re Jewish Child Care Association
of New York, 50 involved the struggle of foster parents to adopt a five-year-
old girl who had been in their care since she was thirteen months old. The
child's mother was a young unmarried girl. The foster parents had been re-
quired to sign a document which provided, in part, that they promised to co-
operate with the agency's plan for continuing a relationship with the child's
natural parents, that they acknowledged they were accepting the child for an
indeterminate period, and that they were aware the legal responsibility for
the child remained with the agency. The foster parents became very at-
tached to the child and repeatedly requested to be allowed to adopt her.
The agency demanded the return of the child and brought a habeas corpus
action against the foster parents when they refused to give up the child. De-
spite the fact that the mother did not request the return of the child, did not
appear prepared to take her back, and saw her only twice in four years, the
court upheld an order removing the child from the foster parents. (This
case was decided before the New York permanent neglect statute was in ef-
fect.) From the majority opinion in this four-to-three decision, it is apparent
that the chief considerations of the court were the traditional concepts of the
paramount nature of the natural parent's rights51 and that the integrity of
the law (as manifested in the placement contract and in the agency's ad-
ministrative decision) had been challenged. 52 The result of this case seems
almost to punish the foster parents for loving the child too much. Also, it
appears that in this decision the best interests of the agency, not the child,
were served. The child was placed in two other homes in a two-year period
following the decision. 58 Thus, the outcome was plainly in contradiction to
the established aim of child welfare, which is to provide a stable family rela-
tionship for such children.
In Marchese v. New York Foundling Hospital,54 the foster parents
sought to adopt their foster child, who had lived with them for four years.
The agency reclaimed the child after the foster parents requested permission
to adopt her. The foster parents had been named as the child's guardian
50. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959).
51. "What is essentially at stake here is the parental custodial right. Although
Child Care has the present legal right to custody . . . it stands, as against the Sanders,
in a representative capacity as the protector of Laura's mother's inchoate custodial right
and the parent-child relationship which is to become complete in the future." Id., at
228, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 69, 156 N.E.2d at 703.
52. "[T]he program of agencies such as Child Care . . . may not be subverted
by foster parents who breach their trust." Id., at 230, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 156 N.E.
2d at 704.
53. J. Goldstein & J. Katz, The Family and the Law 1033-34 (1965).
54. 53 Misc. 2d 234, 278 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1967).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
in a deed of guardianship executed by the natural parents, but the court or-
dered that the child be returned to the agency to be placed elsewhere for
adoption.
[T]he main reason for the decision seems to be that the foster par-
ents in the placement contract with the agency had stipulated that
the child was placed in the home "not with a view toward adop-
tion," and that they agreed to return the child upon request which
could be made at any time in the absolute discretion of the agency.
It is shocking to find modern courts applying the conceptual-
istic principles of commercial law to the human problems involved
in placement cases. There should be no covenant running with the
child, and the child's actual best interest ordinarily should be de-
cisive.55
In other cases involving custody disputes between foster parents and
agencies, it has been held that the agency's decision is paramount, either on
the basis of the placement contract (which usually provides that the foster
parents will give up the child on request), or on the notion that foster parents
have no legal right to custody. 56 However, there are also cases holding that
the agency's decision is not to be given such undue weight and that the best
interests of the child should prevail.
57
In Greco v. Chicago Foundlings Home,58 the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of habeas corpus action brought by prospective adop-
tive parents against an agency. The agency had placed an infant in the
Greco's home for the purpose of adoption. A short time later the child was
placed in a hospital for observation, but was then released. For no apparent
reason, the agency refused to return the child to the foster parents and re-
fused to consent to their adoption of her. The Grecos alleged that the
agency arbitrarily detained the child and withheld its consent, that they were
never given any reason for their disqualification, and that the administrator
bore a malicious personal animosity towards them. The court, nevertheless,
held that such allegations were insufficient to justify its intervention and said
that under Illinois law the agency's consent is necessary before a child can be
adopted. This seems to be an illustration of the view that the agency's deci-
55. Foster & Freed, Family Law, 19 Syracuse L. Rev. 479, 489-90 (1967).
56. Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d 909 (Me. 1971); Convent of Sisters of Mercy v.
Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1950); In re Adoption of Johnson, 144 W.
Va. 625, 110 S.E.2d 377 (1959); State ex rel. Action v. Flowers, 174 S.E.2d 742 (W.
Va. 1970).
57. See, Kurtis v. Ballou, 33 App. Div. 1034, 308 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1970), which
held that a hearing must be held to determine whether the removal of children from
foster parents' custody by an agency is in the best interests of the children. In In re
C.M.D., 256 A.2d 266 (Del. 1969), the Delaware Supreme Court held that an agency
does not have the exclusive duty of deciding the best interests of a child placed in a
foster home, and that the court must make its own determination of such interests in
a custody proceeding. The California case of In re McDonald, 43 C.2d 447, 274 P.2d
860 (1954), held that the consent of the agency is not necessary in a proceeding by a
foster parent to adopt a child.
58. 38 Ill.2d 289, 230 N.E.2d 865 (1967).
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sion is controlling in such cases. The court did not even mention the best
interest of the child. It is apparent that the welfare of the child was not
served here because the child was placed in another foster home when she
could have been adopted by the Grecos. The existing statute59 requiring the
agency's consent is a major obstacle to a court's ability to override an agen-
cy's decision. But if the disqualification of the prospective adoptive parents
is purely arbitrary, it would seem that the courts would have the power, even
under the present statute, to allow the adoption if it would be in the child's
best interest.
In resolving disputes between agencies and foster parents seeking to re-
tain custody or to adopt their foster children, the goals of child welfare
would best be met by considering the welfare of the child in each case and
by recognizing that foster parents and children do have a right to have their
interests given equal weight to those of the agency. Where it appears that
a child will be in foster care for a long period of time, with no hope of reunion
with his natural parents, and where foster care is used to provide a temporary
home for a child eligible for adoption, there should be no reason why fit fos-
ter parents should not be allowed priority in adopting their foster children.60
Instead agencies tend to impose contradictory roles upon foster parents,
expecting them to be substitute parents, but to do so without forming emo-
tional attachments. 6' Also, while asking that foster parents treat a foster
child as they would their own, agencies attempt to maintain ultimate control
over the foster family relationship. Agencies claim such control on the basis
that a court has committed the child to them and that they are legally re-
sponsible and answerable to the court. However, in reality, the courts sel-
dom review foster care placements.6 2 The courts should take a more active
role in determining whether foster parents should be deprived of custody
when the agency so demands.
Where the foster family provides a fit household and seeks to
adopt, one of the primary purposes of foster home placement
would be achieved by such an adoption. Since most foster children
never are reunited with their natural parents and are never
adopted, but instead are shunted about between foster homes or in-
stitutions, it is obvious that public policy should favor adoptions
by fit foster parents. . . . It is hoped that there will be a re-
evaluation of the. . . decision in In re Jewish Child Care Associa-
tion, and that placement agencies will abandon bureaucratic power
struggles and concentrate upon the true best interests of the child.
The fact that bonds of love and affection develop between foster
59. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1971).
60. One writer suggests that legal guardianship is the best solution for children in
need of permanent or long-term foster care, who are not free for adoption or who
have no prospective adoptive parents. Taylor, Guardianship Or "Permanent Placement"
of Children, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 741 (1966).
61. See, In re Alexander, 206 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1968).
62. Katz, supra note 5.
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parents and the foster child should be a factor for permanent place-
ment, rather than the basis for removing the child from the foster
home as in the Child Care Association case.
63
VI. PROPOSALS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
From the differences of opinion and divergent results which are apparent
in the case law concerning foster children, it appears that the best way to in-
sure that foster parents are afforded a voice in proceedings involving their
foster children is by legislative means. At the present time in Illinois, an at-
tempt is being made to extend the rights of foster parents through proposed
amendments to the Juvenile Court Act. These bills have already been unan-
imously approved by the Illinois Senate, and passage is expected shortly in
the House. One bill 64 would amend section 701-20 of the Juvenile Court
Act and would require that the foster parents of any neglected or dependent
minor be given notice of all stages of any hearing or proceeding in which the
custody or status of the minor may be changed. Another proposed amend-
ment65 would require that in every case where a child has been found ne-
glected as a result of physical abuse, custody may not be restored to the
parents until a court hearing is held to determine the fitness of the parents.
These legislative proposals are a necessary beginning step in the recognition
of the rights of foster parents and passage of them appears certain.
The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services plans to intro-
duce further proposals to the legislature which would terminate the rights of
natural parents after two years if they show little interest in their children
who are in foster care. A children's rights bill will also be introduced which
would give a child's wishes greater weight in the determination of such dis-
putes. Such legislation is desperately needed in order to assure that the best
interests of the child are served and it seems that Illinois is finally attempt-
ing to fill this need. This will help to prevent much of the heartbreak that so
often occurs in custody cases involving foster children.
However, aside from these solutions which are being proposed in Illi-
nois, further and more extensive legislation will be necessary to expand the
rights of foster parents. A comprehensive set of laws designed to resolve
the predicament of children in long-term foster care should be enacted.
With the number of such children increasing, definite guidelines are needed
so that they may be protected. This legislation should include a statute mak-
ing foster parents who have had a child in their care for a long period (e.g.,
two years or more) parties to any custody proceeding concerning the child.
This would give such foster parents legal standing to challenge any attempt
to take the child away from them. Also, a comprehensive statute similar to
63. Foster & Freed, supra note 55, at 490.
64. S.B. 32, 78th Gen. Assem. (1973).
65. S.B. 33, 78th Gen. Assem. (1973).
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the New York permanent neglect statute should be enacted.66 This law
is aimed directly at the child who is deserted in long-term foster care.
Where there is no hope that he will be returned to his parents, or when the
parents make no attempt to maintain contact with the child, parental rights
should be terminated. By clearly defining the conditions under which pa-
rental rights may be terminated and by not leaving such conditions open to
divergent judicial interpretation, this statute would free children for adop-
tion and would end the uncertainty for them and their foster parents. An
additional statute should be enacted, similar to one presently in force in
New York, giving foster parents preference in the adoption of a child they
have taken care of for two years or more. The agency's consent to adoption
by foster parents should not be an absolute prerequisite if the court finds
that the foster parents are fit to adopt the child and that such adoption
would be in the child's best interest. This would eliminate the problems
which arise when an agency arbitrarily refuses to allow the adoption on the
basis of the foster placement contract or other grounds.
Statutes calling for more court intervention in foster child cases are also
needed. One suggestion would be a law requiring that placement of chil-
dren away from their homes may be extended only on regular judicial re-
view. 67 In this way, the court may order that a permanent home be found
for the child instead of allowing placement to continue indefinitely. Court
approval should also be required before any child who has lived with his fos-
ter parents for a long period can be removed from their custody. The courts
should consider the best interest of the child above all, weighing such factors
as the child's wishes, the length of time he has lived with the foster parents,
his relationship to them, the degree of contact maintained with the natural
parents, and other relevant circumstances. Courts should be reluctant to in-
terfere with the custodial interest of foster parents who have cared for a
child for a long period of time. If a natural parent seeks to interfere with the
foster relationship, he should be required to prove that the foster parents are
unfit and that the best interests of the child demand a change in custody.
Rather than blindly holding that the rights of natural parents and agen-
cies are paramount, the trend clearly appears to be in the direction of ex-
panded recognition of the interests of children and their foster parents. This
is certainly a more enlightened approach, especially in view of the fact that
human emotions are so deeply involved in these cases. As one caseworker
said, the problem is the legal definition of a parent: "Is the parent the one
who brings life into the world or the one who assumes the responsibilities of
66. For a suggested model statute of this type, see Gordon, supra note 31, at 261-
62.
67. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 355(b), 355(c), 756(b), 756(c) (McKinney 1963);
See In re Bonez, 48 Misc.2d 900, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1966), in which the court refused
to approve extended placement and ordered that a permanent home be sought for the
child.
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raising the child?" 68  The rights of natural parents to their children are in-
deed paramount, until the standard of care they provide falls below that
which society has set as an acceptable minimum. Once the parent has failed
to fulfill his minimum duty of care, the courts must intervene to remove the
child. It is then that the primary and controlling consideration should be the
best interest of the child, rather than parental rights. In order to accomplish
this, it is necessary to broaden foster parents' rights to insure that a child who
has become a part of their family will not be taken away. Surely, those who
have raised a child for years may be considered parents and may be placed
on an equal footing with those who brought the child into the world but
failed to provide him with adequate care.
PATRICIA WHITTEN
68. Keegan, Children Are Losers in Custody Battles, Chicago Tribune, March 21,
1973, § IC, at 6, col. 1.
